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1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent research shows that competition in maritime 
market develops more compound and pretentious 
structure affected by parameters as time, economical 
restraints, technology and innovation, quality, relia-
bility and information management. In relation to 
successful business competence, strategic planning 
should be enhanced considering assets availability, 
involving maintenance and reliability operational as-
pects. The latest technology controlling these param-
eters is focused on monitoring the condition of main 
and auxiliary machinery. 
The INCASS (Inspection Capabilities for En-
hanced Ship Safety) FP7 EU funded research project 
aims to tackle the issue of ship inspection, identifica-
tion of high-risk ships, providing access to infor-
mation related to ship surveys and incorporate en-
hanced and harmonized cooperation of maritime 
stakeholders in order to avoid ship accidents, promote 
maritime safety and protect the environment. 
This paper aims to present the development of a 
Machinery Risk and Reliability Assessment (MRA) 
methodology for ship machinery and equipment as 
well as the MRA Decision Support System (DSS). 
The innovation of MRA methodology is oriented to-
ZDUGVWKHFRPSRQHQWV¶IDLOXUHDQG state interdepend-
HQFLHVSURYLGLQJDKROLVWLFYLHZRIV\VWHPV¶UHOLDELO
ity performance. Furthermore, MRA takes into 
DFFRXQWWKHV\VWHP¶VG\QDPLFVWDWHFKDQJHLQYROYLQJ
failure rate variation within time. In order to approach 
and simulate realistically this dynamic condition 
monitoring control, a continuous dynamic monitoring 
model is introduced. The presented methodology in-
volves the generation of Markov Chain arrangement 
integrated with the advantages of Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBNs). 
All progress and methodology development takes 
place using Object Oriented Programming (OOP) en-
vironment in Java language. Additionally, the MRA 
DSS tool is developed and introduced. This tool uti-
lizes the MRA results by integrating historical data 
and expert judgment in order to assist the ship ma-
chinery inspection and maintenance. Moreover, user-
friendly Graphical User Interface (GUI) is developed 
by involving useful DSS aspects for onboard risk and 
reliability control. Lastly, INCASS project developed 
a measurement campaign, where real time sensor data 
is recorded onboard a tanker, bulk carrier and con-
tainer ship. The gathered data will be utilized for 
MRA DSS tool validation. The entire MRA DSS tool 
is demonstrated in this paper through a case study by 
employing currently simulated input data. Future re-
search steps include the MRA DSS validation using 
real-WLPH UHFRUGHG GDWD DQG WKH FRPSRQHQWV¶ LQIOX
ence interdependencies. 
Hence, this paper is structured in 4 sections. First 
RIDOO6HFWLRQLQWURGXFHVWKHSDSHU¶VVFRSHand mo-
tivation of research. Section 2 refers to the research 
background which involves the exploration of Condi-
tion Based Maintenance (CBM) methodology and 
well known Condition Monitoring (CM) technologies 
and tools. In Section 3 the suggested Machinery Risk 
Analysis (MRA) methodology is presented by 
demonstrating a case study, the MRA DSS and the 
performed results. Section 4 concludes with the dis-
cussions and future work for the MRA development. 
2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
This section demonstrates the latest research back-
ground with regards to maintenance control and Con-
dition Based Maintenance (CBM) methodology. 
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Moreover, this section presents the most-known fail-
ure and risk analysis methods and the latest Condition 
Monitoring (CM) technologies and the tools. 
2.1 Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) 
From operational viewpoint, maintenance is restruc-
tured from reactive to proactive actions, involving 
more control and information of the considered ma-
chinery or system (Dikis et al., 2015b). In this respect, 
maintenance methodologies can be identified as poli-
FLHV LQGLFDWLQJ WKH HQWLUH EXVLQHVV¶V SURILOH 7KHVH
methodologies set the corporate orientation with re-
spect to the applied maintenance strategy and opera-
tions. Different methodologies are introduced in the 
literature (Mobley et al., 2008). Research presents in-
tegration of methodologies and policies, allowing the 
utilization of flexible frameworks. CBM is the latest 
and under continuous development methodology. 
The scope of CBM is to detect the upcoming failures 
before even taking place, aiming to enhance ma-
FKLQH¶VDYDLODELOLW\UHOLDELOLty, efficiency and safety, 
by reducing maintenance costs through controlled 
spare part inventories (Mechefske, 2005). On the in-
dustrial aspect, SKF (2012) states that CBM aims at 
understanding of risks and predetermination of strate-
gic actions, leading to reliability and operational cost 
reduction. 
2.2 Failure and risk analysis methods 
Deteriorating systems developed for the maritime in-
dustry consider internal and external to system fail-
ures as interdependencies occur during operation 
(Delia and Rafael, 2008). Literature presents various 
failure and risk analysis methods, where the majority 
of approaches visualize failure occurrence as inde-
pendent event for each considered component of a 
system. These can be summarized as Fault Tree Anal-
ysis (FTA), Dynamic FTA (DFTA) taking into ac-
count time variation, Failure Mode and Effect Analy-
sis (FMEA) and Failure Mode Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), Markov Analysis (MA) and 
%D\HV¶7KHRUHPSUHVHQWLQJWKH%D\HVLDQ%HOLHI1HW
works (BBNs). 
On the other hand, Lazakis et al. (2010) present a pre-
dictive maintenance strategy utilizing Failure Modes, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA). The model upgrades the exist-
ing ship maintenance regime to an overall strategy in-
cluding technological advances and Decision Support 
System (DSS) by combining existing ship operational 
and maintenance tasks with the advances stemming 
from new applied techniques. On the other hand, 
Lazakis and Olcer (2015) introduce a novel Reliabil-
ity and Criticality Based Maintenance (RCBM) strat-
egy by utilizing a fuzzy multiple attributive group de-
cision-making technique, which is further enhanced 
with the employment of Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP). The outcome of this study indicates that pre-
ventive maintenance is still the preferred maintenance 
approach by ship operators, closely followed by pre-
dictive maintenance; hence, avoiding the ship correc-
tive maintenance framework and increasing overall 
ship reliability and availability. An innovative ship 
maintenance strategy is presented by Turan et al. 
(2011) based on criticality and reliability assessment 
while utilizing the FTA tool with time-dependent dy-
namic gates so as to represent in an accurate and com-
prehensive way the interrelation of the components of 
a system. As part of the reliability assessment, the 
Birnbaum and Criticality reliability importance 
measures are utilized to validate the results of the 
analysis, whereas a case study of a diving support 
vessel (DSV) illustrates the application of this strat-
egy. In order to layout CBM and the processes that 
consists of; Tsang et al. (2006) suggest a data struc-
ture leading to decision analysis according to machin-
HU\¶VFRQGLWLRQSURSRVLQJDPHWKRGIRUGDWD-driven 
CBM. 
2.3 Condition Monitoring (CM) technologies 
CM technology is applied through various tools. 
These tools record and evaluate measurable parame-
ters that will be reviewed in this section such as vi-
bration monitoring, acoustic and ultrasonic monitor-
ing, thermography and oil analysis. CM is identified 
in phases between data acquisition, signal pre-pro-
cessing and feature extraction, signal analysis and 
fault detection, leading to decision-making and fail-
ure prognostics (Delvecchio, 2012). This section is 
focused on the first phase of data acquisition. This 
phase involves the input data record such as displace-
ment, velocity, acceleration, temperature, sound sig-
nal and oil analysis parameters.  
Vibration monitoring is the most known tech-
nique. It offers early indication of machinery mal-
functions by involving rotational speed, loading fre-
quency, environmental conditions and material state 
parameters. These parameters are measured by em-
ploying different types of sensors such as; noncontact 
displacement transducers; velocity transducers and 
accelerometers (Dikis et al., 2015a). On the other 
hand, thermography is a tool, which is applicable to 
both electrical and mechanical equipment, and is de-
ployed to identify hot and cold spots providing early 
signs of equipment failure. As claimed by 
Bagavathiappan et al. (2013), Infrared Thermography 
(IRT) is one of the most accepted CM tools. Due to 
the non-contact function is suitable for detecting 
structural, machinery, electrical and material mal-
functions. Thermography requires thermal cameras 
and thermocouples for recording temperature of ma-
chinery, electrical and electronic installations. 
2.4 Risk and reliability analysis methods 
Risk and reliability analysis methods assess various 
failure case scenarios of deteriorating systems and 
their contributing subsystems and components. Liter-
ature presents various failure and risk analysis meth-
ods, where the majority of approaches visualize fail-
ure occurrence as independent event for each 
considered component of a system. The analysis tools 
examine risk of failure by taking into account quanti-
tative and qualitative aspects. These tools can be sum-
marized as Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Dynamic FTA (DFTA) taking into 
account time dependence, Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Mode Effect and Crit-
icality Analysis (FMECA), Markov Analysis (MA) 
DQG%D\HV¶7KHRUHPSUHVHQWLQJWKH%D\HVLDQ%HOLHI
Networks (BBNs). The latter one examines the relia-
bility performance on system, subsystem and compo-
nents levels by considering functional interdependen-
cies among them. This key feature of BBN is 
significant and innovative, compared to the remaining 
methods, as it allows the simulation of functions and 
operations on actual modelling environment. The 
BBN is defined as probabilistic graphical model in-
volving conditional dependencies arranged into Di-
rected Acyclic Graphs (DAG) and it is expressed as 
presented in Equation 1 (Dikis et al., 2014). ܲሺܣȁܤሻ ൌ ܲሺܤȁܣሻ כ ܲሺܣሻܲሺܤሻ  (1) 
Where P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of events 
A and B, while A given B and B given A are condi-
tional probabilities (* stands for multiplication). Fur-
thermore, innovative features of BBNs involve the 
utilization of decision making and cost functions. 
3 SUGGESTED MRA METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the MRA methodology is demon-
strated targeting to be applied on critical ship machin-
ery and equipment of three different ship types such 
as tanker, bulk carrier and container ship (INCASS, 
2014a). Hence, the MRA methodology is flexible in 
order to fulfil all requirements and specifications for 
each of these three ship types (INCASS, 2014b). Mo-
WLYDWLRQLVEDVHGRQWKHIDFWWKDWUHVHDUFKHUV¶DQGPDU
NHW¶VWHQGHQF\LQYROYHVWKHKROLVWLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI
operational and failure interdependencies among 
multiple components within the same or different sys-
tem. The MRA input data flow consists of three 
stages, the data acquisition and processing, the risk 
and reliability assessment model and the Decision 
Support System (DSS). 
 
Figure 1. MRA and MRA DSS process flow. 
 
All processing, MRA functions and DSS features are 
developed in Java Object Oriented Programming 
(OOP) language. Java is chosen as it is cross platform 
and allows ease of use and compatibility among dif-
ferent Operating Systems (OS). Figure 1 demon-
strates the Machinery Risk/Reliability Analysis 
(MRA) methodology with respect to the process flow. 
On the first stage, the data acquisition and processing 
is considered by involving the raw data collection, 
mining and the safety thresholds. The input data is 
classified into the database on system, subsystem and 
component levels. The input data types are consid-
ered as historical, expert and real time monitoring 
data (sensor raw input). Historical input data involves 
past failures and records. On the other hand, expert 
input/judgement takes into account comments, re-
ports and knowledge from ship crew. Real time sen-
sor input consists of raw (unprocessed) physical 
measurements such as temperature and pressure. All 
gained information is stored in a database and trans-
mitted in the various methodology stages utilizing 
µWH[W¶W[WILOHV7KLVIRUPDWILOHLVVHOHFWHGDVILOHV
are small in size and can be easily and inexpensively 
transferred from the onboard to the onshore environ-
ment (INCASS, 2015). 
The following phase involves the real monitoring 
data/signal processing (i.e. recorded raw data min-
ing). Real time input data is transformed to reliability 
input by considering the density of abnormal meas-
urements within the dataset as well as the amplitude 
of the gathered data. Abnormal levels are assessed 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VDFFHSWDEOHRSHUDWLRQDO
levels. This input data type transformation from phys-
ical measurements to probabilistic indices is achieved 
by employing data clustering analysis of k-means 
(Jain and Dubes, 1988). On the other hand, literature 
demonstrates alternative probabilistic model ap-
proaches by utilizing mixture models such as Gauss-
ian Mixture Model (GMM), c-means and hierarchical 
clustering (Theodoridis, 2015), (Jain et al., 1999), 
(Hand et al., 2001). The following process of the 
MRA methodology employs the physical measure-
PHQWV¶WKUHVKROGV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHVDIHW\LQGLFHV
are considered by setting the acceptable operational 
levels. These safety levels identify the acceptable and 
warning limits of the physical measurements that the 
system should function. Furthermore, the integration 
of the data clustering analysis with the identification 
of the safety thresholds introduces the probability of 
occurrence the observed (recorded) input data to per-
form within the acceptable functional levels. This 
probabilistic measure in percentage generates the in-
put for the following risk and reliability tool. 
The data clustering approach of k-means aims to 
partition the n observations into NQ sets S =  {S1, S2, «6k} so as to minimize the Within-Cluster Sum of 
Squares (WCSS) (sum of distance functions of each 
point in the cluster to the K center). A recorded da-
taset (raw data collection) (x1, x2«[n) is observed, 
where each observation is a d-dimensional real vec-
tor. Hence, k-means data clustering model scope is to 
find (Theodoridis, 2015): ܁ ෍ ෍ԡݔ െ ߤఐԡଶ௫ఢௌ೔௞௜ୀଵ  (2) 
where ȝi is the mean of points in Si as shown in Equa-
tion 2. 
K-means data clustering approach is selected as it 
is suitable for large number of variables. K-means is 
one of the simplest algorithms which uses unsuper-
vised learning method to solve known clustering is-
sues. Moreover, k-means can be computationally 
faster than hierarchical clustering methods. On the 
other hand, k-means can produce tighter clusters than 
hierarchical clustering. Additionally, k-means ena-
bles high flexibility in data analysis as it becomes a 
great solution for pre-clustering, reducing the space 
of each cluster and allowing the integration with other 
algorithms for further processing. 
,Q WKH VHFRQG VWDJH µ5HOLDELOLW\0RGHO¶ WKHSUR
cessed reliability input data is introduced. The risk 
and reliability model employs a network arrangement 
similar to the Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs). This 
selection allows the probabilistic modelling by con-
sidering functional relations and system, subsystem 
and component interdependencies. In the case of dy-
namic modelling, the time dependencies and state di-
vision of the reliability input are developed in parallel 
with the network model. The MRA application em-
ploys the mathematical tool of Markov Chains (MC) 
(Fort et al., 2015). MC is mathematical system that 
undergoes transitions from one state to another on a 
state space. 
Furthermore, MC is selected as it is flexible to set 
up by allowing different levels of state sequence com-
plexity. In order to understand the dynamic probabil-
istic modelling, a schematic diagram is presented in 
Fort et al. (2015). The presented subsystem sample 
includes in total three states within the timeline. 
Firstly, historical processed data from the previous 
time slice are provided shown as t-1. The current state 
(t) is calculated, whereas the predictive state is shown 
as future state t+1. As it can be seen in Figure 2 each 
time slice (t-1, t, t+1) is based on the previous state. 
This single state transition from past to present and 
then to forecasted future is known as Markov Chain 
(MC). The generic probabilistic expression is shown 
in Equation 3. On the other hand, Equation 4 presents 
the PoW per expressed component/subsystem in the 
future t+1 time slice. Where, P(wt+1) denotes the 
PoW in future state (t+1) by taking into account pre-
vious working and failing states P(wt) and P(ft) re-
spectively. 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic probabilistic network arrangement. ܲ௑ሺ௡ିଵሻǡ௑ሺ௡ሻ ൌ ܲሼܺ௧೙ ൌ ܺ௡ȁܺ௧೙షభ ൌ ܺ௡ିଵሽ (3) ܲሺݓ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܲሺݓȁݓ௧ሻܲሺݓ௧ሻ ൅ ܲሺݓȁ ௧݂ሻܲሺ ௧݂) (4) 
While, each component of a sub-system is linked with 
a certain number of failure modes that varies between 
components, a generic form expressing the failure 
case scenarios is presented in Equation 7. In this ex-
pression, P denotes the Probability of Survival (PoS) 
for different failure scenarios, where w shows the 
PoW state while f shows the PoF. The relation of w 
and f is shown in in Equation 8. Whereas, ftfn indi-
cates the failure mode (i.e. noise, vibration, overheat-
ing etc.). 
Specifically, P1 denotes the PoW and PoF states 
while one failure mode takes place (ftf1) (Equation 4). 
Accordingly, P2 denotes the PoW state for a different 
failure mode (ftf2) (Equation 5). Whereas, P3 repre-
sents the PoW and PoF states while ftf1 and ftf2 take 
place at the same time (Equation 6). 
ଵܲ ൌ ൜ݓǣ ? ? ?െ  ݂ݐ௙ଵ݂ǣ݂ݐ௙ଵǢ (5) 
ଶܲ ൌ ൜ݓǣ ? ? ?െ  ݂ݐ௙ଶ݂ǣ݂ݐ௙ଶǢ (6) 
ଷܲ ൌ ቊݓǣ ? ? ?െ ሺ݂ݐ௙ଵ כ ݂ݐ௙ଶሻ݂ǣሺ݂ݐ௙ଵ כ ݂ݐ௙ଶሻǢ (7) 
௠ܲ ൌ ሺ݂ݐ௙ଵ כ ݂ݐ௙ଶ כ  ݂ݐ௙ଷ כ ǥ כ݂ݐ௙௞ሻ (8) ݂ ൌ  ? ? ?െ ݓ (9) 
Equation 9 shows the relation among working and 
failing state reliability performance. Equation 10 pre-
sents the generic expression of the overall PoS per 
component, including the summation of all possible 
break down scenarios (m: total amount of failure sce-
narios) and the summation of all considered failure 
types (k: total amount of failure types). In addition the 
relation of m and k is presented in Equation 11. 
ܲሺܿ݋݉݌ሻ ൌ ෍ሺ෍ ܲሺ݂ݐ௙ሺ௜ሻǡ ݂ݐ௙ሺ௝ሻሻሻ௞௜ୀଵ௠௝ୀଵ  (10) ݉ ൌ  ?௞ (11) 
The third stage of the MRA tool implements the De-
cision Support System (DSS) aspects. The MRA DSS 
methodology is divided into two sections. The first 
one utilizes local (onboard) and short term decision 
making suggestions, whereas the second one is used 
onshore (global) for longer term predictions and de-
cision features. The MRA DSS demonstrates the con-
sidered systems, subsystems and components into a 
tree structure form. The operator has the option of 
choosing each of these and getting information re-
lated to past, current and predicted reliability perfor-
mance. This research paper is focused on the Machin-
ery Risk and Reliability Assessment (MRA) tool. 
Hence, the introduced application, in the following 
section, performs utilizing the MRA methods and the 
risk and reliability aspects. 
3.1 MRA case study 
In this section, a Machinery Risk/Reliability Analysis 
(MRA) case study is presented by involving the ship 
Main Engine (M/E), two subsystems and multiple 
components. The case study assesses the working 
state reliability performance on subsystem and com-
ponent levels by analyzing various probable failure 
case scenarios. The case study employs simulated in-
put data that are generated utilizing normal distribu-
tion (Gaussian). The safety thresholds (i.e. safety in-
GLFHV DUH LGHQWLILHG WKURXJK WKH HQJLQH¶V
PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V PDQXDO DQG WKH HQJLQH¶V VHD WULDOV
These safety indices are selected as they fulfil the 
PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG VHD WULDOV SURYLGH
the ideal available reference point for further compar-
ison. 
7KHPRGHO¶VDUUDQJHPHQWFRQVLGHUVWKHVKLS0DLQ
Engine (M/E), the cylinder assembly and starting air 
subsystems. In the case of the first subsystem four 
components are involved such as the crosshead bear-
ing, piston lube oil, piston liner and cylinder safety 
valve, whereas in the case of the starting air subsys-
WHPWKHF\OLQGHUV¶VWDUWLQJDLUYDOYHVVFDYHQJLQJDLU
receiver and scavenger air distributor are taken into 
account. Most of these components, where applica-
ble, are analyzed with respect to 6 items per compo-
QHQWDVWKHHQJLQH¶VPDQXDOXVHGLVIURPDVL[-cylin-
der marine diesel engine. Table 1 demonstrates the 
raw input data requirements that MRA methodology 
is tested. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Raw input data requirements. 
System Component Measurement Unit 
Cylinder 
Assembly Crosshead Bearing Temperature °C 
 Piston Lube Oil Temperature °C 
 Piston Liner Pressure bar 
 
Cylinder Safety 
Valve Pressure bar 
Start Air Start Air Distributor Temperature °C 
 Start Air Receiver Pressure bar 
 Start Air Valves Pressure bar 
Figure 3 demonstrates the Main Engine (M/E) MRA 
network case study. This network consists of cross-
head bearings, piston lube oil measures (one per cyl-
inder), cylinder liners and safety valves, cylinder 
starting air valves, scavenger air receiver and scaven-
ger air distributor. There are two modelling ap-
proaches to structure this network. The first approach 
links the involved components directly to the cylinder 
assembly and starting air system nodes. The second 
approach as shown in Figure 3 takes into account an 
intermediate level of nodes that sums up the predic-
tions of the working state reliability performance per 
group of identical components. Due to Equation 11, 
the first approach will involve 32 measures to be con-
sidered for the calculation of the overall cylinder as-
sembly subsystem. This relation (m = 2k), where k=32 
(components), will create almost 4.3 billion failure 
case scenarios to be calculated in order the overall 
performance of the subsystem to be examined. This 
network arrangement will cause further programming 
effort as well as increased calculation and processing 
time. 
On the other hand, the demonstrated network ar-
rangement involves relations where k=6. Hence, the 
developed and programmed failure case scenarios per 
component are limited to 64. In other words, only 324 
failure case scenarios for the seven involved compo-
nents have to be assessed for the introduced MRA 
network arrangement. The proposed network struc-
ture advances to high calculation performance and 
simpler code deveORSPHQW2Q WKH UHVXOWV¶SHUVSHF
tive, the first network modeling approach (without in-
termediate node level) is more analytical by assessing 
more failure case scenarios. These scenarios assess 
the failure of crosshead bearings at the same time with 
the piston lube oil, the piston liners and the valves (as 
Equations 5-9 show). The combination of multiple 
failures creates impractical low predicted working 
state reliability performance. On the other hand, these 
analytical scenarios demonstrate the sequential fail-
ure of components (interconnections). This sequential 
failure assessment can be introduced in the simpler 
and faster proposed network arrangement by intro-
ducing the functional component interdependencies. 
Hence, programming and calculation effort can be 
gained without involving unnecessary scenarios that 
their results do not demonstrate the practical function-
ality of the system. 
 
Figure 3. Main Engine (M/E) MRA network case study. 
3.2 MRA DSS case study model arrangement 
First of all, Figure 4 presents the MRA DSS analysis 
of failure predictions through a user-friendly Graph-
ical User Interface (GUI). The user has available in-
formation related to cost analysis, maintenance ac-
tions, reliability performance predictions and 
symptoms due to reliability loss. In Figure 4 is shown 
the current subsystem and component reliability per-
formance and the associated warning and failures. 
 
Figure 4. MRA DSS analysis of failure prediction. 
 
On the other hand, Figure 5 demonstrates the symp-
toms tab in a graphical format and five days predic-
tion in advance from the current moment. The graphs 
are presented in days for this occasion and with the 
grid marking four-hour intervals on the time axis. 
This is to coincide with the regular four-hourly visits 
the engineers onboard the ship performs. 
 
Figure 5. MRA DSS plotting of results. 
3.3 MRA case study results 
This section presents the results of the MRA Main 
Engine (M/E) case study. The outcomes are demon-
strated on component and subsystem level. The raw 
input observations involve simulated datasets, 48 
measurements per day and 2 days total data of histor-
ical/existing information. First of all this case study 
proves the ability of predicting the working state reli-
ability performance on subsystem and component 
levels. This methodology introduces the requirement 
relation of forecasting double period of time of the 
provided recorded historical input. In other words, 
two days of existing input predicts the working state 
reliability performance of the following four days. 
 
Figure 6. Reliability performance of crosshead bearings. 
 
The figure above demonstrates the predicted working 
state reliability performance of the six crosshead 
bearings. The uniformity of the predicted results 
among the crosshead bearings is expected due to the 
utilization of simulated input datasets. Furthermore, 
simulating real system functioning, each component 
performs on different reliability levels as various pa-
rameters affect each bearing. The overall reliability 
performance of the crosshead bearings, as shown in 
Figure 6, confirms acceptable forecasted working lev-
els. On the other hand, negligible reliability perfor-
mance loss is forecasted per bearing. This minor reli-
ability difference is expected as the employed input 
datasets figure only two days of performance. Hence, 
the upcoming forecasts perform low reliability loss 
for the following four predicted days. The overall re-
liability demonstrates performance from 99% to 
98.9% and almost stable temperature at 52.3 °C. The 
PDULQH HQJLQH¶V PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V PDQXDO LGHQWLILHV
normal operational temperature levels from 50-70 °C 
and warning alarm level at 75 °C. Hence, there is no 
indication of upcoming failure or abnormal compo-
nent functioning. 
6LPLODUO\ WKH VL[ OXEH RLO SLVWRQV¶ IRUHFDVWHG
working state reliability performance are considered. 
Similar prediction behavior is shown as in the cross-
KHDGEHDULQJV¶FDVH7KHXQLIRUPUHVXOWVDUHH[SHFWHG
as well for the same reasoning as above. The overall 
working state reliability performance shows almost 
stable predictions at 93% (reliability) and 59.6 °C. 
Both results are acceptable as the engine manufac-
turer sets the safety threshold at 65 °C (not exceed-
ing). 
 Figure 7. Reliability performance of piston liners. 
 
In the cases of the crosshead bearings and the piston 
lube oil, the safety threshold sets the maximum (up-
per) limits that the warnings are introduced if the pre-
dictions exceed these. On the other hand, Figure 7 
presents the working state reliability performance of 
WKH SLVWRQ OLQHUV 7KLV FRPSRQHQW¶V LQSXW PHDVXUH
ment requires the monitoring of pressure. Hence, the 
PDQXIDFWXUHU¶VPDQXDOXWLOL]HVVDIHW\Lndices that the 
pressure should not drop lower than the predefined 
levels. The overall reliability demonstrates perfor-
mance at almost stably 97.8%, whereas the pressure 
LVDWEDUV7KHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VUHTXLUHPHQWVSHF
LILHVWKHSLVWRQOLQHU¶VSUHVVXUHVKould not drop lower 
than 116 bars and should not exceed 160 bars. 
Similarly, the reliability performance of the cylin-
der safety valves shows stable progress through time 
at 99.5% and 6.8 bars. In this respect, the acceptable 
functional level is set within the range of 6.5-7.5 bars 
and the warning is specified at not lower than 5.5 bars. 
In other words, the current reliability performance of 
all involved components (i.e. crosshead bearings, pis-
ton lube oil, liners and cylinder safety valves) is ac-
ceptable and there is no need for maintenance actions. 
As the scope of this study is to identify and examine 
the working state reliability performance, it is essen-
tial to highlight that the stable performance so far sets 
the ground for further functioning of all components. 
 
Figure 8. Reliability performance of starting air components. 
 
Similarly, Figure 8 demonstrates the reliability per-
formance of the scavenger air receiver, starting air 
distributor and starting air subsystem. The reliability 
levels progress stably through time higher than 98%. 
Lastly, the overall reliability performance at subsys-
tem level for the cylinder assembly and the starting 
air subsystem cases is taken place. Due to the fact, all 
the components perform stable reliability perfor-
mance, hence the subsystem does. In the case of the 
subsystem reliability assessment, there is no actual 
measure to classify and identify a specific threshold. 
However, expert judgment can provide a valid indi-
cation on which level the warning should be shown 
and further analysis on component level can be trig-
gered. The overall subsystem reliability performance 
is expected to be increased once inspection and 
maintenance actions are taken on component level. 
4 DISCUSSION 
This paper demonstrates the development of the Ma-
chinery Risk Analysis (MRA) tool. MRA is probabil-
istic risk/ reliability analysis model established 
through the work performed in INCASS project. The 
investigation of literature takes into account the hu-
man error issues and maintenance operation control 
that motivated this research study. Moreover, the lit-
erature review presented in this paper consists of the 
latest Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) method-
ology, the most applied and developed Condition 
Monitoring (CM) technologies and tools. The re-
search is introduced by assessing the state-of-the-art 
of risk and reliability analysis methods. 
The suggested MRA methodology is proposed as 
well as the MRA reliability modelling approach. The 
MRA methodology consists of three processing and 
assessment stages. The first stage involves the input 
data requirements, collection and processing, 
whereas the second stage takes into account the risk 
and reliability tool development. Furthermore, the 
third assessment stage consists of the MRA Decision 
Support System (DSS) and the utilization of histori-
cal, expert and predicted reliability results to assist the 
inspection and maintenance planning. The developed 
MRA methodology is focused on the risk and relia-
bility assessment by employing various input data 
types such as historical, expert and real time sensor 
data. The methodology consists of multiple pro-
cessing and assessment methods. 
Firstly, the gathered datasets are analyzed by em-
ploying raw data mining process of k-means. This as-
sessment identifies the tendency of the recorded input 
to downgrade and lead to safety threshold before it 
exceeds the warning level. The safety thresholds can 
be specified according to the identified requirements. 
,QWKLVFDVHHQJLQHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VPDQXDOLVXWLOL]HG
providing accurate and tested reference points (i.e. 
sea trials) for setting the safety indices. The dynamic 
probabilistic network arrangement is proposed by 
considering flexible Markov Chains (MC) and the re-
liability tool based on Bayesian Belief Networks 
(BBNs). The proposed methodology is applied on a 
case study utilizing a six cylinder marine diesel en-
gine, the cylinder assembly subsystem, and four com-
SRQHQWV¶PHDVXUHPHQWV VXFKDV WKHFURVVKHDGEHDU
ings, piston lube oil, piston liners and cylinder safety 
valves. The developed MRA tool predicts the work-
ing state reliability performance on system, subsys-
tem and component levels. 
On the current research development, the dynamic 
risk and reliability tool is validated by ship owners, 
operators and service providers. According to their 
expert judgment, the assessed subsystem and compo-
nents perform within acceptable reliability levels of 
VKLSRZQHUV¶RSHUDWRUV¶VHUYLFHSURYLGHUV¶DQG&ODV
VLILFDWLRQ6RFLHWLHV¶UHTXLUHPHQWV2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
WKHDFFXUDF\RIWKHUHOLDELOLW\WRRO¶VIRUHFDVWHGUHVXOWV
is verified by employing commercial software such as 
Genie 2.0, Hugin 7.8 and the Markov Chain (MC) 
modelling using Reliability Workbench. 
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